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Abstract
We investigate the eﬀect of international diﬀerences in corporate taxation on the
realization of productivity gains in M&A deals. We argue that tax diﬀerentials distort
the eﬃcient allocation of productive factors following an M&A and thus mitigate the
resulting productivity improvement. Using ﬁrm-level data on inputs and outputs of
production as well as on corporate M&As, we estimate that a 1 percentage point incre-
ase in the absolute tax diﬀerential between the locations of two merging ﬁrms reduces
the subsequent total factor productivity gain by 4.5%. This eﬀect is less pronounced
when ﬁrms can use international proﬁt shifting to attenuate eﬀective diﬀerences in tax-
ation. In a complementary analysis, we use an event study design and a ﬁxed eﬀects
model to explore the timing of the response of productivity, as well as, labor and capital
input to the tax rate diﬀerential after the merger separately for the acquirer and the
target. We show that our ﬁndings are mainly driven by deals with targets residing in
locations with a tax advantage with respect to the acquirer. In these transactions, tax
diﬀerentials reduce the post-merger adjustment in the target ﬁrm and inhibit the full
realization of productivity gains.
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1 Introduction
The international transmission of technologies and innovation is a major driver of global
productivity growth. An important device in this process are corporate mergers and acquisi-
tions (M&As) which provide direct inter-regional links between ﬁrms and open up channels
for technology transfers (Jovanovic & Rousseau, 2008). However, whether or not the poten-
tial productivity gain in these transactions materializes strongly depends on the post-merger
behavior of the combined ﬁrm.1 In this paper, we investigate how ﬁrm-level adjustment af-
ter M&As is aﬀected by diﬀerences in proﬁt taxation between the target and the acquirer.
These diﬀerences regularly occur in cross-border mergers and are thus likely to inﬂuence
productivity improvements in the ﬁrms involved in these deals.
Our main ﬁnding is that tax diﬀerentials between the target and the acquirer location
reduce post-merger productivity gains by distorting the reallocation of activity within the
combined ﬁrm. Since the ﬁrm's objective is to maximize its net proﬁt, it takes into account
both the productivity and the corporate tax implications of a potential location choice. If
the more productive unit resides in the location with the more favorable tax regime, the
resulting allocation choice assigns production to the most productive units irrespective of
the actual tax rate diﬀerential. However, if the more eﬃcient unit happens to reside in a
location with a higher tax burden, ﬁrms face a trade-oﬀ. Shifting activity to the high-tax
location raises overall productivity but also increases the tax burden on the resulting proﬁts.
For large enough tax diﬀerences, the ﬁrm allocates activity to the less productive but more
proﬁtable unit. With regard to the overall productivity of the merged ﬁrm, this decision is
ineﬃcient and leads to a lower gain in productivity resulting from the M&A. This mechanism
only occurs when ﬁrms cannot separate the location of productive activity from the location
of its taxation. If ﬁrms were able to assign proﬁts to the location of their preference (i.e.
the location with the lowest tax rate), tax diﬀerences would not be relevant. In practice,
such proﬁt shifting activity is limited by domestic and international regulations and because
ﬁrms usually incur some shifting cost. Nevertheless, the impact of tax diﬀerentials may be
mitigated if ﬁrms engage in proﬁt shifting activities such as transfer pricing.
The described eﬀect is generally not unique to M&As but would be caused by any event
that changes tax diﬀerentials within multinational groups (e.g. tax reforms). However, the
reallocation of activity within existing groups of ﬁrms is usually associated with a high ﬁxed
cost and thus rarely observed. In contrast, the completion of an M&A transaction provides
an opportunity to exploit returns to scale and consolidate units operating in the merging
ﬁrms that perform similar functions. As a consequence, substantial restructuring within the
newly formed enterprise is common. In such an environment, the ﬁxed cost of a reallocation
of functions is weighted less heavily and ﬁrms are likely to react to tax diﬀerentials.
Below we formulate a simple theoretical model to demonstrate this mechanism. We then
investigate the impact of tax diﬀerentials on merger-induced productivity gains empirically.
For this purpose we combine data on M&As from Bureau van Dijk's Zephyr database with
1Throughout the paper we use the terms merger, acquisition and M&A interchangeably. Even though the
individual deal types certainly diﬀer in their structure, they all result in a combination of two ﬁrms which
is the key issue in our analysis.
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ﬁrm-level information on inputs and outputs from the AMADEUS and ORBIS databases.
First, we derive total factor productivity (TFP) for each individual ﬁrm within the sample of
industry peers using the estimation method of Levinsohn & Petrin (2003). We then compute
the TFP change resulting from an M&A deal and relate it to the absolute tax diﬀerence
between the target and the acquirer. Our estimations, which include a large set of country-,
deal-, and ﬁrm-speciﬁc controls, suggest that an increase in the absolute tax diﬀerential by
1 percentage point lowers the merger-induced productivity gain by 4.5%. We also show that
this eﬀect is mitigated when transfer pricing regulations are less strict. In a complementary
analysis, we turn to the underlying mechanisms of this eﬀect. Results of a ﬁxed eﬀects
model and an event study suggest that the impact of the tax diﬀerential is asymmetric in
the sense that the observed eﬀect is mainly driven by deals where the level of taxation in the
target location is lower than the one in the acquirer location. Following these transactions,
the adjustment process in the target is hampered by the distorting tax incentive as ﬁrms
make less reductions to employment and capital in the target ﬁrms involved. This ﬁnding is
consistent with the notion that ﬁrms leave activity in the location with the lower tax burden
which raises after-tax proﬁt but also implies that some productivity gains from the M&A
are not realized and the overall increase in productivity is smaller or even negative.
Our paper thus contributes novel insights to the growing literature on corporate M&As
and taxation. Various studies have identiﬁed tax policy to be an important driver of M&A
activity (e.g. Di Giovanni, 2005; Erel et al., 2012; Feld et al., 2016a,b).2 Furthermore, taxes
do not only inﬂuence whether but also how ﬁrms conduct M&As. For example, Ayers et al.
(2004) and Faccio & Masulis (2005) show that capital gains taxation aﬀects the method of
payment in M&As. All of these studies investigate the role of tax rates as a determinant of
the observed pattern of M&As and thus essentially focus on the eﬀect of taxation before the
M&A is completed. In contrast, our paper highlights the importance of the tax environment
after the M&A completion. Existing studies with regard to this aspect have mainly looked
into the importance of taxation on ﬁnancial variables. For instance, Ayers et al. (2003) and
Huizinga et al. (2012) study realized deal values and show that shareholder-level taxation
has a strong eﬀect on deal premiums. In our analysis, we are interested in real outcomes
of M&A. Huizinga & Voget (2009) and Voget (2011) show that taxes are an important
determinant for the post-merger choice of headquarter location within the merged ﬁrm.
However, while these allocation choices constitute real behavioral responses of ﬁrms, they
have only minor eﬀects on the structure of production within the ﬁrm. Our investigation
focuses on taxation as a determinant of post-merger allocation of productive input factors
and therefore reveals new insights into how tax diﬀerences aﬀect the productive process and
the evolution of productivity within the ﬁrm.
Thus, we also complement the large literature on productivity eﬀects of M&As. Generally,
M&As are perceived as an opportunity for productivity improvements. Results by Li (2013)
suggest that this potential is indeed realized, mostly because the acquiring ﬁrm uses input
2In yet another study on M&A determinants, Rossi & Volpin (2004) do not include taxation in their
estimations but acknowledge that taxes are a potential determinant of the deal volume which is, however,
too complex an issue to deal with in the broad scope of their paper.
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factors of the target more eﬃciently. Other M&A outcomes that may have a positive impact
on ﬁrm productivity are an increased level of innovation (Stiebale, 2016), knowledge transfers
(Bresman et al., 1999; Bena & Li, 2014) and increased management eﬃciency (Wang & Xie,
2009). For cross-border takeovers, the positive eﬀect of M&A on productivity is probably less
pronounced. Foreign ﬁrms usually acquire the most productive ﬁrms in a country (Criscuolo
& Martin, 2009) but the integration of these ﬁrms into the multinational group is more
complex such that productivity improvements are realized only after a longer period of
adjustment (Harris & Robinson, 2002). Indeed, a recent study by Wang & Wang (2015)
ﬁnds no diﬀerence in the productivity eﬀect of domestic and foreign acquisitions in a large
sample of M&As in China. The impact of cross-border acquisitions on productivity probably
depends on a large range of country-pair characteristics. In our analysis, we argue that
international taxation is a relevant factor in this regard. We thus provide an important
determinant of the realization of post-merger productivity gains which may help explain
part of the ambiguity in previous studies on M&A and productivity.
Finally, our paper advances the debate on whether and how foreign proﬁts should be
taxed in the presence of international M&As. Becker & Fuest (2010) and Devereux et al.
(2015) emphasize that the answer depends on the resource allocation mechanism within the
ﬁrm after the merger. If adjustment in one part of the ﬁrm aﬀects production in another
part, tax diﬀerentials distort the allocation mechanism and lead to sub-optimal outcomes.
Since a tax on foreign income may avoid these diﬀerentials, such a policy is superior to
an exemption regime in this case. We argue that this situation occurs in the post-merger
allocation of corporate activity and provide empirical evidence for the loss that arises in the
form of foregone productivity gains from M&As when tax neutrality is not ensured.
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we develop a theoretical model to formally
analyze the relationship between merger-induced productivity changes and tax diﬀerentials.
We explain our empirical strategy in Section 3 and describe the data in Section 4. Results
are presented in Section 5. Section 6 concludes.
2 M&As, Taxation and Productivity Gains
2.1 Tax Diﬀerentials and Productivity Change Through Realloca-
tion of Activity after M&As
In this section we develop a simple theoretical framework to analyze the impact of tax
rate diﬀerences on the realization of productivity gains in M&As. We consider a merger or
acquisition involving two ﬁrms, a and b. Each of these ﬁrms consists of a set of separable
units that each perform a diﬀerent function and also diﬀer in their total factor productivity
with respect to this function. Prior to the merger, a subset of functions is performed in both
ﬁrms. An obvious example are cross-divisional functions such as distribution, promotion or
research and development. Once the deal is completed, the management decides for each of
these functions whether the respective task is performed by a unit in a or b. This reallocation
of activity is a potential source of post-merger productivity gains if a particular function is
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assigned to the unit that is more productive with respect to this task. However, as managers
maximize net proﬁt rather than output, the allocation decision may also be aﬀected by other
factors such as taxes, which distort the allocation decision.3 We show that tax diﬀerentials
between the merged ﬁrms may lead to an allocation of functions that is ineﬃcient with
respect to productivity. As a consequence, tax diﬀerentials reduce or even revert productivity
gains resulting from the merger.
We begin by deriving the proﬁt of a unit performing function i in ﬁrm s = a, b. It is
given by
pis (i) = As (i) ks (i)
α
ls (i)
β − rsks (i)− wsls (i) (1)
where ks (i) and ls (i) are capital and labor input of ﬁrm s in the unit performing function
i, rs and ws are the respective input prices and As (i) is the total factor productivity of
the unit performing function i in ﬁrm s. Within the unit, we assume decreasing returns to
scale, α + β < 1.4 For given input prices, the management of the ﬁrm chooses the level of
productive inputs for each individual unit i so as to maximize the unit-speciﬁc proﬁt pis (i).
This yields the set of optimal input choices
l∗s (i) = As (i)
γ
(
β
ws
)(1−α)γ (
α
rs
)αγ
, k∗s (i) = As (i)
γ
(
β
ws
)βγ (
α
rs
)(1−β)γ
(2)
where γ = 11−α−β . Substituting the input choices back into the proﬁt function, we obtain
the optimal proﬁt
pi∗i,s = As (i)
γ
ϕs (3)
where
ϕs = ϕs (rs, ws) =
1− r(2−2β−α)γ−
1−β
α
s α
1−β
α − w(2−2α−β)γ−
1−α
β
s β
1−α
β(
wβs β−βrαs α−α
)γ
is a function of input prices and is decreasing in both rs and ws.
We ﬁrst consider the post-merger production allocation decision without taxes. To sim-
plify our derivation, we assume that factor prices are identical for both ﬁrms, such that
ϕa = ϕb. This assumption is realistic, for example if capital input is purchased on the inter-
national capital market and wages reﬂect some form of quality-adjusted labor compensation.
The latter can be assumed to be homogeneous across diﬀerent locations if the labor market
is suﬃciently integrated. Abstracting from input price diﬀerentials allows us to clearly iso-
late the eﬀect of tax diﬀerentials on post-merger productivity changes. We note, however,
that frictions in the markets for labor or capital may preclude uniform input prices and we
therefore relax this assumption in our empirical analysis below.
3The analysis thus follows a notion that is similar to the one proposed for ﬁrm replacement by Foster
et al. (2008).
4Note that this does not preclude increasing returns to scale across the ﬁrm. For example, units may
incur a ﬁx cost fi such that merging two units reduces the average ﬁx cost and generates synergies through
increasing returns to scale.
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To simplify notation, we deﬁne the diﬀerence in total factor productivity between a and
b for the unit performing function i by λ (i) = Aa (i)−Ab (i) and normalize Ab (i) to 1 such
that Aa (i) = 1 +λ (i). The objective function of the management is the overall proﬁt of the
ﬁrm which is the aggregate of the proﬁts of the individual functions, Πs =
∫
i∈I pis (i) di. Πs
is maximized by optimally allocating the individual functions to the most proﬁtable unit,
that is, the management allocates the function i to a unit in a instead of b if
pi∗a (i) ≥ pi∗b (i)⇐⇒ λ (i) ≥ 0. (4)
and vice versa.5 In this case, only the productivity diﬀerential λ (i) determines where activity
is located and the resulting post-merger productivity for the unit performing function i in
the merged entity is given by
A (i) =
Aa (i) if λ (i) ≥ 0Ab (i) if λ (i) < 0. (5)
In order to derive the total productivity change in the combined ﬁrm, we aggregate the
productivity of each individual unit. For analytical reasons, we assume that there is a large
continuum of functions i ∈ I. The overall productivity of the merged ﬁrm is deﬁned as the
weighted aggregate of the productivity of all units, A =
∫
i∈I ω (i)A (i) di, where ωi are the
unit-speciﬁc weights with
∫
i∈I ω (i) di = 1 that depict the importance of each unit in the
combined ﬁrm.6
We assume that in the merged entity, a subset of functions J is of the interchangeable
sort described above while a subset of functions H are unique to each ﬁrm. The overall
productivity prior to the merger is thus given by
APre =
∫
i∈I
ω (i)A (i) di =
∫
i∈H
ω (i)A (i) di+
∫
i∈J
ω (i) (zAa (i) + (1− z)Ab (i)) di (6)
The productivity of the units performing the interchangeable functions is again given by
the weighted mean of the productivity in both ﬁrms where 0 < z < 1 is the relative weight of
ﬁrm a in the merging entity. After the merger, productivity in each of these units corresponds
to the productivity of the respective units in one of the ﬁrms. The overall productivity is
then given by
APost =
∫
i∈H
ω (i)A (i) di+
∫
i∈J
ω (i) (Aa (i)1 {λ (i) ≥ 0}+Ab (i)1 {λ (i) ≥ 0}) di (7)
Eventually, we are interested in the productivity change after the merger or acquisition is
completed. We deﬁne this change as the diﬀerence of overall productivity before and after
5Without loss of generality, we assume that the management has a slight bias towards a.
6This setup abstracts from complementarities between individual functions. Adding this feature to the
model would probably make it more realistic but would also imply that allocation decisions are interdepen-
dent. This would lead to a high degree of complexity without adding new insights to or contradicting our
main result.
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the merger and denote it by Γ:
Γ =APost −APre
=
∫
i∈H
ω (i) (Aa (i)1 {λ (i) ≥ 0}+Ab (i)1 {λ (i) < 0} − zAa (i)− (1− z)Ab (i)) di. (8)
Let λ (i) be distributed across some interval
[
¯
λ, λ¯
]
. We can then rewrite expression (8) in
the following way
Γ = (1− z)
∫ λ¯
0
ω (i)λ (i) dλ (i) + z
∫ 0
¯
λ
ω (i) (−λ (i)) dλi (9)
Expression (9) deﬁnes the productivity change as the weighted sum of productivity changes
realized by allocating functions. Here, we abstract from taxes and potential factor price dif-
ferentials such that the management allocates each function to the most productive location
with respect to this function. As a consequence, the merger-induced productivity change is
positive, Γ ≥ 0. Note, that expression (9) comprises both cases where each ﬁrm has a pro-
ductivity advantage in some functions and cases where one ﬁrm is generally more productive
than the other (e.g. λ (i) > 0 ∀i). The latter case often occurs in acquisitions when a large
market leader takes over a smaller ﬁrm.
We now introduce tax diﬀerentials to our model. For simplicity, we assume that input
costs are fully deductible such that the after-tax proﬁt of the unit performing function i
in ﬁrm s is given by (1− τs)pi∗s (i). When allocating functions between the two ﬁrms, the
management now maximizes the overall after-tax proﬁt of the merged ﬁrm such that it
allocates function i to a instead of b if
(1− τa)pi∗a (i) ≥ (1− τb)pi∗b (i)⇐⇒λ (i) ≥ τ˜ =
(
1− τb
1− τa
) 1
γ
− 1 (10)
When taxes are identical for both ﬁrms, τa = τb, we have τ˜ = 1 and the setting is
identical to the case without taxes as no distortions are expected without tax diﬀerentials.
However, if taxation diﬀers between the two ﬁrms, τ˜ 6= 1, the management may allocate
some activity to the ﬁrm with lower productivity but higher after-tax proﬁt. The expression
for the productivity change now reads
Γˆ = Γ−
∫ τ˜
0
ω (i)λ (i) dλ (i)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Λ
. (11)
The last term Λ (τ˜) describes the unrealized productivity gains that are caused by the
distorting eﬀect of tax diﬀerentials with regard to the allocation of functions. It disappears
if τa = τb as limτ˜→1 Λ = 0. Note that we have Λ ≤ 0 irrespective of the direction of the tax
diﬀerential. This implies that any tax diﬀerence between the target and acquirer location
may lead to distorted allocations and thus reduces productivity gains resulting from the
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merger. Also, Γˆ does not need to be positive. For example, consider the case where ﬁrm a
is more productive in all units, but is taxed substantially more such that τ˜ is very large. In
this extreme case, all functions are performed by the less productive location because of the
tax diﬀerence and the productivity change is negative.
Furthermore, Λ is a decreasing function of the absolute tax diﬀerential. To illustrate this,
consider the situation where τb > τa such that τ˜ > 1 or τa > τb such that τ˜ < 1. In both
cases, an increase in the absolute tax diﬀerential ∆τ = |τa − τb| raises |τ˜ | and leads to a
decline in Λ. Thus, the merger-induced productivity change is a negative function of the
absolute tax diﬀerential:
∂Γˆ
∂∆τ
≤ 0. (12)
2.2 Cross-Border Proﬁt Shifting
So far, we have assumed that statutory tax rate diﬀerentials between merging ﬁrms correctly
reﬂect the actual diﬀerence in taxation as perceived by the management. This is the case
if the proﬁt generated in each subsidiary of the merged ﬁrm is correctly attributed to the
location of activity. In an integrated company, this could, for example, be achieved through
adequate transfer pricing. In practice, however, ﬁrms may be able to manipulate their ef-
fective tax burden through proﬁt shifting (e.g. see Hines & Rice, 1994; Huizinga et al.,
2008). While previous studies have identiﬁed various forms of international proﬁt shifting
that use very diﬀerent shifting vehicles7, all of these approaches have in common that they
reduce the tax payments in high tax locations of a multinational company by shifting part of
the proﬁt generated there to low-tax locations within the group. This leads to a convergence
of eﬀective tax rates in the various aﬃliate locations of the ﬁrm towards the lowest statutory
rate in the multinational enterprise.
In the context of our framework above, this implies that the presence of proﬁt shifting
leads to a decrease in the absolute tax diﬀerential. We formalize this notion by assuming
that a ﬁxed proportion 0 < φ < 1 may be shifted between the two entities after the merger.8
As the ﬁrm maximizes after-tax proﬁt, shifting occurs only towards the location with a lower
tax rate. The eﬀective tax rate in location s is then given by
τs = (1− φ) τs + φmin (τa, τb) . (13)
φ can be viewed as a function of the strictness of transfer pricing regulations and proﬁt shif-
ting opportunities between a and b. Substituting this into the absolute tax rate diﬀerential,
we obtain ∆τ = (1− φ) |τa − τb| where it is apparent that more proﬁt shifting opportunities
(i.e. higher φ) imply a smaller eﬀective tax rate diﬀerential. Furthermore, we note that
7See Dharmapala (2014) for a comprehensive survey.
8Economic models usually assume that proﬁt shifting induces some cost that is a convex function of
the amount shifted (e.g. Hines & Rice, 1994). In our reduced-form expression, this would imply that φ is a
function of the tax rate diﬀerential. However, since shifting is constrained to the realized proﬁt, we still have
0 < φ < 1 and would thus obtain the same results with respect to the eﬀect of the tax rate diﬀerential on
the post-merger productivity change as described in our more simple model.
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∂2Γˆ
∂∆τ∂φ
≥ 0 (14)
such that an increase in the share of shifted proﬁts mitigates the negative eﬀect of statutory
tax rate diﬀerentials on the productivity change after the merger. For example, we expect
that the distorting eﬀect of tax diﬀerentials in a cross-border merger is less severe if loose
regulations regarding transfer pricing allow the management to manipulate proﬁt allocation
and thus narrow the diﬀerence in the eﬀective tax burden between the two locations.
2.3 International Taxation
In the following, we brieﬂy describe how tax diﬀerentials between diﬀerent locations of a
multinational enterprise may arise in the international tax system.9 When analyzing the
impact of tax rate diﬀerentials on the productivity change after an M&A deal, the relevant
perspective is that of the management of the merged ﬁrm. Most M&A deals take the form
of an acquisition and it is thus reasonable to assume that allocation decisions are taken
from the perspective of the acquirer country. In the following we always refer to the tax
rate faced by the acquiring ﬁrm when describing a tax rate as eﬀective. The relevant tax
rate diﬀerential is thus the diﬀerence between the tax rate on proﬁts that the acquirer ﬁrm
receives from the target in the form of dividends and the tax rate on proﬁts realized at
the acquirer location. The tax burden in each location depends on the statutory corporate
income tax rate and the withholding tax rate (if applicable) for inter-corporate dividends.
The resulting diﬀerence depends strongly on the approach taken by the acquirer coun-
try to relieve ﬁrms of double taxation. The exemption method, which is applied by most
European countries, fully or partially exempts foreign income from corporate taxation. The
tax burden for proﬁts received from the target is thus determined by the corporate income
and withholding taxes in the target location, and the resulting tax rate diﬀerential is mainly
driven by cross-border diﬀerences in these tax rates. Some countries, like the United States
and, until 2009, Japan and the United Kingdom, apply the credit method instead. With this
approach, foreign income is taxed at the domestic corporate tax rate but taxes paid abroad
are credited against the domestic tax liability. This credit is usually limited to the amount of
domestic tax payments due. As a consequence, tax diﬀerentials only arise when the eﬀective
tax rate of the acquirer country is below that of the target country. Credit regimes diﬀer in
the scope of the credit. A direct credit only considers the withholding tax paid abroad while
indirect credits also include the underlying taxation of corporate proﬁts.
For our empirical analysis, we compute for each individual M&A deal from the per-
spective of the acquiring ﬁrm the eﬀective tax rates on proﬁts realized by the target and the
acquirer, respectively. We then use the absolute diﬀerence between these eﬀective tax rates
one year after the completion of the M&A deal as a proxy for the expected post-merger tax
rate diﬀerential that determines the allocation within the merged ﬁrm. When determining
the tax diﬀerential, we take into account international diﬀerences in statutory tax rates as
9See Huizinga & Voget (2009) for a comprehensive description of double-taxation of cross-border divi-
dends.
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Table 1: Tax Rate Diﬀerentials
This table summarizes the computation of the diﬀerence between the eﬀective tax rate on proﬁts that a ﬁrm
in location a receives from a ﬁrm in location b in the form of dividends and the tax rate on proﬁts realized
in location a. τCITa and τ
CIT
b are the top statutory tax rates in location a and b, respectively. τ
w
ba is the ﬁnal
withholding tax rate on dividends paid from location b to location a. ψ is the exemption rate.
Double Tax
Relief
Method
Absolute Eﬀective Tax Rate Diﬀerence ∆τ
Exemption
∣∣τCITa ψ − (1− (1− ψ) τCITa ) (τCITb + (1− τCITb ) τwba)∣∣
Indirect
Credit
∣∣τCITa − τCITb − (1− τCITb ) τwba∣∣ if (1− τCITb ) τwba ≥ τCITa
0 if
(
1− τCITb
)
τwba < τ
CIT
a
Direct
Credit
∣∣τCITa − τCITb − (1− τCITb ) (τCITa − τwba)∣∣ if τwba < τCITa∣∣τCITa − τCITb − (1− τCITb ) τwba∣∣ if τwba ≥ τCITa
well as the treatment of foreign proﬁts for tax purposes in the acquirer country. Table 1
describes the computation of the absolute tax rate diﬀerential for the various double tax re-
lief methods. The latter may either be based on unilateral approaches, bilateral tax treaties
or multilateral agreements such as the Parent-subsidiary Directive which requires European
Union (EU) and European Economic Area (EEA) members to exempt proﬁts of substantial
holdings in other member states from domestic taxation. Furthermore, we check whether
ﬁnal withholding taxes apply upon repatriation of foreign proﬁts. Again, the level of these
taxes depends on domestic legislation as well as the existence of bilateral or multilateral
agreements.
3 Empirical Strategy
3.1 Identiﬁcation
The objective of this paper is to analyze how tax diﬀerentials between the acquirer and the
target ﬁrm aﬀect the impact of the merger on the total factor productivity of the combined
ﬁrm. For this purpose we estimate a reduced form of equation (11) by relating the merger-
induced change in productivity to the absolute tax diﬀerential. Our empirical model takes
the following form:
Γˆjlk = lnA
Post
j − lnAPrej = α0 + α1∆τjlk + β1Xj + β2Zjlk +ψ + j . (15)
Our theoretical analysis suggests that the relationship between the productivity change
and the tax rate diﬀerential is probably non-linear such that using the simple diﬀerence of
TFP before and after the merger is not appropriate. Instead, we use the diﬀerence in the
logarithms of TFP before and after the merger. This transformation mitigates the problem
of outliers and turns out to be the most appropriate among a range of speciﬁcations (see
Appendix A.2).
APrej and A
Post
j are the average estimated TFPs of the combined ﬁrm that emerges from
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deal j in the observable years before and after the completion of the M&A deal, respectively.
Below, we explain in more detail how TFP is estimated. A major advantage of analyzing
the TFP of the combined ﬁrm rather than focusing on the eﬀect in the acquirer or target
ﬁrm is that we avoid tax-driven measurement errors in the input variables. These may occur
if ﬁrms engage in ﬁctitious relocation of economic activity after the merger. For example, a
ﬁrm may use transfer pricing to assign labor expenses to the high-tax location in the merged
ﬁrm. This would raise labor input there without aﬀecting the output in this location and
thus would seemingly induce a decline in productivity of the high-tax aﬃliate while total
factor productivity would appear to increase in the low-tax aﬃliate. However, since there
was no actual reallocation of resources, this change in productivity would be misleading.
More precisely, even though the perceived productivity change would certainly be a result of
the tax diﬀerential between the two locations, it would not constitute the real productivity
eﬀect that we are interested in but would rather be a result of tax-optimizing ﬁnancial
accounting. Analyzing the TFP of the combined ﬁrm avoids this problem because artiﬁcial
relocations of productive factors net out when consolidating acquirer and target ﬁrm.
The tax diﬀerential is deﬁned as ∆τjlk = |τl − τk| where τk is the top statutory tax rate
on corporate proﬁts realized in the acquirer location and τl is the eﬀective tax rate one year
after the completion of deal j from the perspective of the acquirer on proﬁts realized by the
target ﬁrm. The coeﬃcient of interest is α1 which measures the eﬀect of one percentage point
of absolute diﬀerence in target and acquirer tax rates on the productivity change resulting
from the M&A deal. According to our theoretical model we expect α1 to be negative.
We also check whether a certain type of tax diﬀerential drives our result by disaggregating
∆τjlk into positive and negative diﬀerentials, ∆τ
+
jlk and ∆τ
−
jlk with
∆τ+jlk =
|τl − τk| if τl > τk0 else
∆τ−jlk =
|τl − τk| if τl < τk0 else.
In our estimation, we control for various deal-, ﬁrm- and location-speciﬁc variables that
might aﬀect the productivity change and post-merger performance more generally in line
with the previous literature.10 Xj is a vector of deal characteristics. Since most of the
variation in ∆τlk stems from cross-border deals which themselves might have a particular
eﬀect on ﬁrm productivity, we include a dummy that indicates whether a deal involves two
ﬁrms located in diﬀerent countries. Furthermore, we include dummies that are equal to
one when the takeover resulted from a hostile bid, when target shareholders where paid in
stocks rather than cash, when the deal included a capital increase and when the acquirer
ﬁrm already had a toehold in the target ﬁrm before the acquisition was announced.
Zjlk is a vector of characteristics of the target as well as the acquirer ﬁrm and their
10See for example Harris & Robinson (2002), Herman & Lowenstein (1988), Fu et al. (2013), Fee & Thomas
(2004), Stiebale (2016).
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respective locations. On the ﬁrm level, these include the relative size of both ﬁrms measured
by the acquirer to target ratio of total assets, leverage, which is deﬁned as the ratio of current
liabilities to current assets, ﬁrm age and an indicator for listed acquirers. We also account for
relevant factors on the country level by controlling for wage diﬀerentials between target and
acquirer location which are proxied by the logarithmic ratio of acquirer to target GDP per
capita, as well as, the logarithm of GDP and GDP per capita growth. Since domestic taxes
might also have direct eﬀects on ﬁrm productivity, we include the statutory corporate tax
rate of the target in our regression.11 Furthermore, we include the logarithm of the distance
between the capitals of the acquirer and target country and a dummy that indicates if the
merging ﬁrms are both located inside the European Union.
Each estimation contains a set of ﬁxed eﬀects ψ which comprise target and acquirer
country-ﬁxed eﬀects, target and acquirer industry-ﬁxed eﬀects (2-digit US SIC code) and
year-ﬁxed eﬀects. The variable of interest ∆τjlk mainly varies across target and acquirer
country pairs such that we cluster standard errors on the country pair level.12
Our theoretical model predicts that the eﬀect of the tax diﬀerential is less pronounced
when ﬁrms are able to easily allocate proﬁts to the location with the more favorable tax
rate. We test this notion in our empirical framework by interacting ∆τjlk with an indicator
for the looseness of transfer pricing regulations in the target and acquirer location for a
deal, LOOSEjlk. This variable thus exploits both variation across country pairs and within
country pairs as transfer pricing legislation changes over time. It is equal to one whenever in
both the target and the acquirer country, the applicable transfer pricing regulations do not
include a documentation requirement by law. We focus on the documentation requirement
since the existence of transfer pricing regulations alone does not impose a suﬃcient con-
straint on corporate proﬁt shifting if ﬁrms are not obliged to properly explain the assigned
transfer prices to the tax authorities. Furthermore, previous studies suggest that documenta-
tion requirements indeed constrain international proﬁt shifting (e.g. Beer & Loeprick, 2015;
Beuselinck et al., 2015).13 Our empirical model is deﬁned as follows:
Γˆjlk = α0 +α1∆τjlk+α2∆τjlk×LOOSEjlk+α3LOOSEjlk+β1Xj+β2Zjlk+ψ+j . (16)
As above, we expect α1 to be negative while α2 should be positive and capture the mitigating
eﬀect of loose transfer pricing rules on the impact of the tax diﬀerential. More precisely,
α1 ≥ α2 with α1 = α2 indicating that the eﬀect of the tax diﬀerential on the productivity
change may be completely eliminated if transfer pricing rules are suﬃciently loose.
Transfer pricing regulation in the two locations of the merging ﬁrms may not be equally
important for the productivity change. For example, it may be more relevant for the acquirer
11We note that this may be correlated with the absolute tax rate diﬀerential and also run regressions
without the statutory tax rate in the target location as control variable to check whether collinearity drives
our ﬁndings. In these estimations we obtain very similar results.
12To verify the robustness of our results, we have also conducted a regression analysis with a two-way
clustering of standard errors as suggested by Cameron et al. (2012) and again obtained signiﬁcant coeﬃcients.
13A comprehensive overview of the legislation regarding transfer pricing documentation in a large number
of countries is provided by Zinn et al. (2014).
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location if most of the transfer pricing adjustments are taken in the headquarter. Further-
more, the strictness of transfer pricing regulations may be more important in the location
with the higher eﬀective tax rate from which proﬁt is shifted away. We investigate this
asymmetry by interacting the absolute tax rate diﬀerential ∆τjlk with a set of dummies
LOOSEAcqjlk and LOOSE
Tgt
jlk that indicate whether the transfer pricing regulations do not
require documentation in the acquirer or target country, respectively, and another set of
dummies LOOSEHighjlk and LOOSE
Low
jlk , which indicate the same for the location with the
higher and the lower eﬀective tax rate, respectively. When computing the latter set of dum-
mies, we set LOOSEHighjlk = LOOSE
Acq
jlk and LOOSE
Low
jlk = LOOSE
Tgt
jlk whenever the tax
rate diﬀerential is zero.
Having explored the relationship between tax diﬀerentials and productivity changes on
the deal level, we conduct a further inquiry to investigate the mechanisms underlying our
result. Our theoretical model makes no assertion to what extent tax diﬀerentials aﬀect
productivity gains in the acquirer or the target ﬁrm. Assuming a merger between similar
ﬁrms, the eﬀect is expected to be symmetric. However, in practice, this may not necessarily
be the case: Acquirer ﬁrms are often much larger (e.g. Moeller et al., 2004) and also more
productive (e.g. Schoar, 2002). It is thus likely that the ineﬃcient relocation described above
which results in lower overall productivity gains occurs more often with respect to the
target, that is, merged ﬁrms do not eﬃciently relocate to the more productive acquirer if
the target location has a lower tax rate. Furthermore, the management of the merged ﬁrm
often originates from the acquiring company and therefore may be less reactive towards tax
diﬀerentials that induce a (ineﬃcient) relocation away from the acquirer location. From a
methodological perspective, an explanation for such a ﬁnding may be that the acquiring
entity is so much larger than the target that a productivity change induced by the M&A
deal and the following relocation of resources between the two is hard to observe in the data
of the acquiring ﬁrm.
We are thus interested in whether the productivity eﬀects of the tax diﬀerential are more
pronounced in the target or the acquirer ﬁrm. Bearing in mind the potential measurement
errors described above, we estimate a regression model that relates acquirer and target ﬁrm
TFP to the absolute tax diﬀerential. To capture the evolution of total factor productivity
more precisely, we use a panel regression for this purpose. The respective empirical model
is speciﬁed as follows:
ln (Aj,t) = α0POSTj,t+α1∆τjlk×POSTj,t+β1Xj × POSTj,t+β2Zjlk,t+ψ+j,t (17)
where Ajt is the estimated total factor productivity in year t of a ﬁrm related to merger
j, that is either the combined, the target or the acquirer ﬁrm. POSTj,t switches to one in
the year after the merger is completed. α0 thus captures the general impact of the merger
on the total factor productivity while α1 again is the heterogeneity in this eﬀect that is
attributed to the tax diﬀerential. Xj and Zlk,t are the same vectors of deal, target and
acquirer speciﬁc variables as deﬁned above. The eﬀect of the time invariant variables is fully
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captured by ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects and we thus interact Xj with a vector of indicators for the
post-merger period. Finally, ψ comprises ﬁrm- and year-industry-ﬁxed eﬀects. The latter
capture industry-speciﬁc time trends of productivity.
We also check whether we can observe the expected pattern of allocation of productive
factors after the merger. This is done by replacing the dependent variable in equation (17)
with the logarithms of the employment and tangible ﬁxed assets in the target and the
acquirer ﬁrm. In this estimation, the eﬀect of the absolute tax diﬀerential may not be
symmetric. We check this by disaggregating ∆τjlk into positive and negative diﬀerentials,
∆τ+jlk and ∆τ
−
jlk as described above. Alternatively, one could use the simple tax diﬀerential
instead of the absolute one. However, the underlying assumption for such an estimation is
that tax rate diﬀerentials have a symmetric eﬀect on the productivity change which is not
necessarily the case as explained above. Using ∆τ+jlk and ∆τ
−
jlk imposes a less restrictive
framework.
In a ﬁnal analysis, we verify our results using an event study design. This methodology
was originally developed for the ﬁnance and accounting literature by Fama et al. (1969) but
has since been adjusted and is now widely applied in economic studies (Corrado, 2011).14 In
general, an event study tracks the behavior of observed individuals around an event which is
deﬁned as the M&A deal completion for our purposes. It has two important beneﬁts. First,
it allows us to explore the timing of distortions in the post-merger adjustment process more
systematically. This provides further insights with regard to the underlying mechanism and
also informs us about the persistence of these distortions. Second, this method allows us to
check whether pre-merger trends in TFP and factor input cause spurious ﬁndings. Ruling
out such trends would strengthen the causal inference from our regression results.
For the event study, we adjust the speciﬁcation of Sandler & Sandler (2014) for our
purposes such that the empirical model looks as follows:
ln yj,t =α−3
M−t∑
n=3
Dj,t−n ×∆τjlk +
3∑
n=−2
αnDj,t−n ×∆τjlk + α4
t−N∑
n=4
Dj,t−n ×∆τjlk
+ γ−3
M−t∑
n=3
Dj,t−n +
3∑
i=−2
γnDj,t−n + γ4
t−N∑
i=4
Dj,t−n
+ β1Xj × POSTj,t + β2Zjlk,t +ψ + j,t. (18)
The dependent variable yj,t is TFP, labor or capital input of the acquiring, target or the
combined ﬁrm as described above for the panel regression. It is regressed on a range of
dummies Dj,t−n which indicate whether the deal in which entity j is involved has been
completed in period t−n. Within the ﬁrst and last data year,M and N , we deﬁne our event
window to 3 years before until 4 years after the merger completion.15 The end points of this
window are open brackets, that is, they indicate whether the merger has been completed 4
14More recent applications of event studies in economics include Almond et al. (2011), Chetty et al. (2014)
and Hoyne et al. (2016).
15We experimented with alternative window deﬁnitions and obtained similar results.
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or more years before (for the upper window limit) and 3 or more years after a given period
(for the lower window limit). This mitigates collinearity with the year-ﬁxed eﬀects. The
regressor for the period before the merger completion is omitted and normalized to zero
such that remaining coeﬃcients have to be interpreted relative to the pre-merger year. Our
event study speciﬁcation is augmented by the same set of ﬁxed eﬀects and control variables
as the panel regression model.
While the coeﬃcients of the individual dummies γn capture the direct eﬀect of the merger
on the outcome variables, we are interested in the distortive impact of tax diﬀerentials on
this eﬀect. We thus interact the dummies with the absolute tax rate diﬀerential ∆τjlk and
add this set of interactions to the regression model to obtain our coeﬃcients of interest αi.
The latter measure how a tax diﬀerential of one percentage point changes the impact of the
merger on the outcome variable n years after (if n < 0) or before (if n > 0) the merger
completion relative to the year before the M&A is executed. If tax diﬀerentials only aﬀect
the adjustment process after the two ﬁrms have merged, one should not ﬁnd an eﬀect for
pre-merger years, that is, we should obtain αn = 0 ∀n > 0.
3.2 Productivity Estimation
An important prerequisite for analyzing the eﬀect of within-ﬁrm tax diﬀerentials on producti-
vity changes after M&As is a precise estimate of total factor productivity in the involved
ﬁrms. A common approach is to estimate the parameters of a Cobb-Douglas production
function by regressing ﬁrm output on the main input factors labor and capital, compute the
predicted values and back out total factor productivity as the residual. However, the latter
contains both the total factor productivity of the entity and a potential productivity shock
which is not observed by the researcher but known to the ﬁrm. Since the latter also aﬀects
the input choices of the ﬁrm, a simultaneity problem arises. Previous studies have addressed
this issue by either using investments (Olley & Pakes, 1996) or intermediate inputs (Levin-
sohn & Petrin, 2003; Wooldridge, 2009) as proxies for the ﬁrm expectation regarding future
productivity changes.
In this paper, we estimate total factor productivity using ﬁrm level data on inputs and
outputs from Bureau van Dijk's AMADEUS and ORBIS databases. In doing so, we closely
follow Fons-Rosen et al. (2013) who also use ORBIS and apply the Levinsohn & Petrin
(2003) procedure. Output is measured as ﬁrm value added while inputs are labor, which
is the total cost of employees, and capital, which is deﬁned as the total assets of the ﬁrm.
Following Levinsohn & Petrin (2003), ﬁrm expectations about future productivity shocks
are proxied by intermediate inputs which are measured as the cost of materials.
This approach yields consistent estimates of total factor productivity but is also very
demanding in terms of required data. Missing ﬁrm level data are imputed as described by Gal
(2013) in order ensure a suﬃcient sample size. Before conducting the productivity estimation,
we also check the balance sheet data obtained from Bureau van Dijk for consistency errors.
The relevant steps for constructing the productivity estimation sample are described in detail
in Appendix A.1.
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We conduct our productivity estimation using the universe of available ﬁrms in ORBIS
and AMADEUS that reside in either an OECD or an EU member country and contain
suﬃcient observations with reliable information on the relevant variables. This sample of
1,366,343 ﬁrms with annual data between 2000 and 2013 also contains the acquirer and
target ﬁrms of interest. We estimate total factor productivity using the Levinsohn & Petrin
(2003) method within each 2-digit US SIC code industry. The ﬁrm- and year-speciﬁc total
factor productivities for the ﬁrms involved in an M&A during the observation period are
then used in the main analysis.
4 Data
We collect M&A deals from the Zephyr database. An important advantage of Zephyr is that
target and acquirer ﬁrms are each assigned a unique Bureau van Dijk ID which allows us to
match balance sheet data from ORBIS and AMADEUS to the deal-level data and compute
total factor productivity before and after the merger. Only deals with ﬁrms for which we
obtain suﬃcient data to estimate total factor productivity for the year before and the year
after the deal completion are used in the estimation. We also exclude ﬁnancial and insurance
ﬁrms16 and privatizations of state-owned enterprises.
Table 2: M&A Deal Sample
Acquirer
country
Code Target Country
BE BG CZ DE EE ES FI FR GB HR HU IT NL NO PL PT RO SE SI SK Total
Austria AT . . . . . . 1 1 . 1 1 . . . . . . . . . 4
Belgium BE 36 . 1 1 . 2 . 1 . . . 1 . . . . 1 . . . 43
Bulgaria BG . 8 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Czechia CZ . . 21 . . . . . . . 1 1 . . . . . . . 1 24
Germany DE 4 . 2 19 . 3 1 4 3 . 1 . . . 2 . 3 2 . . 44
Estonia EE . . . . 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Spain ES . . 2 1 . 192 . 3 2 . . 6 . . . 5 . . . . 211
Finland FI . . . 1 2 . 106 . . . . . . 1 1 . . 6 . . 117
France FR 7 . . . . 4 . 77 2 . . 5 1 . . . . 2 . . 98
UK GB . . . . . 4 . 4 38 . . . . . . . . 1 . . 47
Croatia HR . . . . . . . . . 15 . . . . . . . . 3 . 18
Hungary HU . . . . . . . . . . 5 . . . . . . . . . 5
Italy IT 3 . 1 1 . 8 1 4 2 2 . 76 . . . . . 3 1 . 102
Norway NO . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 . . . 2 . . 11
Poland PL . . . 1 . . . . . . . . . . 5 . . . . . 6
Portugal PT . . . 1 . 5 . . . 1 . . . . . 11 . . . . 18
Romania RO . . . . . . . 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Sweden SE 1 . . 1 . 1 7 . 1 . . . . 3 1 . . 93 . . 108
Slovenia SI . . . . . 1 . . . 2 . 1 . . . . . . 8 . 12
Slovakia SK . . 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 6
Total 51 8 28 26 4 220 116 95 48 21 8 90 1 13 9 16 4 109 12 6 885
We restrict our sample to M&A deals which constitute a full acquisition or a merger to
make sure that after the completion of the deal, the management of the combined ﬁrm has
full control over the target and acquirer assets and thus possesses the means to reallocate the
resources. The resulting sample consists of 9,649 ﬁrm-year observations for combined ﬁrms
which are involved in 896 M&A deals. For 885 deals we observe TFP before and after the
16These are deﬁned as ﬁrms with US SIC codes 60-67.
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merger for both the acquirer and the target ﬁrm. These deals form the estimation sample for
our main analysis. Their distribution across acquirer and target countries is summarized in
Table 2. 18% of them are cross-border deals and thus provide the source of variation in the
Table 3: Summary Statistics: Deals
Variable Observations Mean Standard deviation Min Max
Cross-border 885 0.180 0.384 0 1
∆τ 885 1.043 2.260 0 20.75
∆τ+ 885 0.626 1.586892 0 18.43
∆τ− 885 0.417 1.764 0 20.75
LOOSE 885 0.410 0.492 0 1
LOOSEAcq 885 0.437 0.496 0 1
LOOSETgt 885 0.429 0.495 0 1
LOOSEHigh 885 0.446 0.497 0 1
LOOSELow 885 0.421 0.494 0 1
Hostile 885 0.001 0.034 0 1
Stock-for-Stock 885 0.012 0.111 0 1
Capital Increase 885 0.014 0.116 0 1
Horizontal 885 0.409 0.492 0 1
Toe 885 0.045 0.208 0 1
Acquirer Listed 885 0.101 0.301 0 1
EU Member 885 0.932 0.252 0 1
Log Distance 885 5.553 0.679 3.980 7.862
tax rate diﬀerential. Table 3 displays summary statistics for the other deal-speciﬁc variables.
Most of the deals are paid in cash with only 1.2% of stock-for-stock deals in our sample.
Only 10.1% of acquirers are listed on the stock market. In our sample, the absolute tax
diﬀerential ranges up to 20.8% with an average of 1.0%. Given that a substantial number of
M&As in our sample are domestic deals with no tax diﬀerence, this points to signiﬁcant tax
diﬀerential among cross-border deals. Indeed, for this sub-group, the average tax diﬀerential
is 4.3%. 41% of deals in our sample comprise an acquirer and target location in both of which
transfer pricing documentation is not required at the completion of the deal. This ﬁgure is
also high among cross-border deals with a share of 35.2% involving locations with loose
transfer pricing regulations and neither diﬀers much between target and acquirer locations
nor between high and low tax locations.
The deal sample is then combined with balance sheet data from the ﬁnancial databases
of Bureau van Dijk as well as the estimated TFP. Table 4 provides summary statistics for
these variables. On average, acquirer ﬁrms are slightly more productive than target ﬁrms
before the merger. This relation reverses after the M&A is completed, possibly pointing at
some within-ﬁrm reorganization after the merger. As is commonly observed, acquirer and
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target ﬁrms diﬀer substantially in size. In our sample, acquirers are on average about 18
times larger than the target ﬁrm in terms of total assets. They are also older and more
leveraged. A positive average of the wage diﬀerence suggests that acquirers generally invest
in countries with a lower level of labor compensation than in their home location.
Table 4: Summary Statistics: Firms
Variable Observations Mean Standard deviation Min Max
Log TFP (combined ﬁrm) 7,379 0.652 0.951 -4.906 5.777
Log TFP (Acq.) 8,815 0.642 1.004 -6.369 7.120
Log TFP (Acq., before the merger) 4,691 0.653 0.943 -5.005 6.375
Log TFP (Tgt.) 9,672 0.586 0.976 -5.024 6.375
Log TFP (Tgt., before the merger) 4,512 0.640 0.962 -6.369 7.120
Relative Size 7,388 17.686 54.001 0.007 995.950
Leverage (Acq.) 9,262 1.762 56.786 0 4933.701
Leverage (Tgt.) 9,621 1.006 3.939 0 224.5
Log Age (Acq.) 9,493 2.972 0.870 0 5.298
Log Age (Tgt.) 9,841 2.774 0.854 0 4.942
CIT (Acq.) 14,681 0.302 0.056 0.1 0.52
CIT (Tgt.) 14,681 0.299 0.056 0.1 0.52
GDP p.c. Growth (Acq.) 11,844 0.014 0.043 -0.190 0.220
GDP p.c. Growth (Tgt.) 11,844 0.015 0.044 -0.190 0.220
Log GDP (Acq.) 13,716 27.258 1.156 23.020 28.803
Log GDP (Tgt.) 13,716 27.180 1.171 23.020 28.803
Wage Diﬀerence 13,716 0.027 0.252 -2.295 2.331
5 Results
5.1 Tax Diﬀerentials and Changes in Total Factor Productivity
Before turning to the results of our econometric analysis, we ﬁrst investigate the sample
graphically. Figure 1 plots the evolution of TFP of the combined ﬁrm before and after the
merger. For each particular period it presents the average logarithm of TFP in our sample of
merged ﬁrms. We diﬀerentiate between mergers with an absolute tax diﬀerential of zero (the
blue, solid line) and deals with a positive absolute tax diﬀerential between the acquirer and
target location (red, dash-dotted line). Combinations of ﬁrms with no diﬀerence in taxation
between the two locations are generally more productive. However, this diﬀerence becomes
more pronounced after the M&A deal is completed as TFP increases for ﬁrms with zero
tax diﬀerentials while it declines for ﬁrms with positive tax diﬀerential. Consistent with our
theoretical model, this indicates that M&A deals with positive tax diﬀerentials have lower
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productivity gains than those without distortive diﬀerences in target and acquirer taxation.
Of course Figure 1 may also capture the impact on TFP of other deal characteristics that
are correlated with the induced tax diﬀerential. For example, cross-border deals are more
prevalent when the tax diﬀerential is positive but probably also generate lower productivity
gains because integrating two ﬁrms that are located in diﬀerent countries may be very
costly.17
Figure 1: Evolution of TFP before and after the M&A
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In our regression analysis, we control for these confounding eﬀects. Table 5 presents the
main ﬁndings. Column (1) displays results for a parsimonious regression with a set of ﬁxed
eﬀects as described above but no control variables. The resulting coeﬃcient is signiﬁcantly
negative, suggesting that an increase in the absolute tax diﬀerential reduces the productivity
gain after the merger.
We augment the regression by including control variables in columns (2) and (3). Only
coeﬃcients for the ﬁrm- and deal-level variables are displayed while results for the location
speciﬁc characteristics are relegated to Appendix A.3. The estimation results suggest that
hostile M&As (i.e. deals that go ahead without the approval of the target ﬁrm's management)
generate signiﬁcantly lower productivity gains. This may reﬂect that the acquiring ﬁrm
often faces substantial resistance by executives of the target ﬁrm when integrating it after
the merger. Furthermore, deals which are ﬁnanced via a capital increase also yield lower
productivity gains which may be related to the observation that these deals often involve
a large number of participants on the acquirer side. Such a consortium may ﬁnd it more
diﬃcult to make decisions regarding the ﬁrm reorganization after the M&A completion.
In column (3), we account for industry-level variation. M&A often coincide with shifts
17Note however, that a tax diﬀerential of zero does not necessarily imply that the deal is domestic. Some
countries have identical tax rates for some time (e.g. Norway and Sweden) while others applied the credit
regime with respect to foreign dividends (e.g. the United Kingdom) which, assuming zero withholding taxes,
also leads to a zero tax diﬀerential in the case of cross-border acquisitions of targets with lower tax rates
relative to the acquirer location.
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Table 5: Benchmark
OLS regression. The dependent variable in columns (1), (2), (4) and (5) is the diﬀerence in the logarithm
of average productivity after and before the merger. In columns (3) and (6) the dependent variable is the
diﬀerence in the logarithm of average productivity before and after the merger relative to the industry mean
(SIC 2 digit code). Columns (2), (3), (5) and (6) contain regression results with country-level controls for
which estimated coeﬃcients are reported in Table A.1 in the Appendix. All regressions include target and
acquirer country ﬁxed eﬀects, target and acquirer industry ﬁxed eﬀects and year ﬁxed eﬀects. Cluster robust
standard errors (clustered at the acquirer-target country-pair level) are provided in parentheses. Stars behind
coeﬃcients indicate the signiﬁcance level, * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
∆τ -0.030***
(0.010)
-0.045**
(0.018)
-0.038***
(0.014)
∆τ− -0.047**
(0.019)
-0.051*
(0.026)
-0.055**
(0.026)
∆τ+ -0.018
(0.011)
-0.040
(0.024)
-0.022
(0.017)
Cross-border 0.028
(0.146)
0.021
(0.132)
0.029
(0.146)
0.025
(0.131)
Hostile -0.930**
(0.397)
-0.171
(0.324)
-0.931**
(0.394)
-0.178
(0.319)
Stock-for-Stock 0.249
(0.172)
0.239
(0.196)
0.253
(0.172)
0.251
(0.196)
Capital Increase -0.311***
(0.098)
-0.355***
(0.085)
-0.313***
(0.098)
-0.362***
(0.086)
Horizontal -0.041
(0.034)
-0.022
(0.026)
-0.040
(0.034)
-0.019
(0.026)
Toe 0.044
(0.093)
0.118
(0.095)
0.042
(0.092)
0.111
(0.094)
Relative Size -0.000
(0.000)
-0.000
(0.000)
-0.000
(0.000)
-0.000
(0.000)
Leverage (Acq.) 0.026
(0.040)
0.000
(0.039)
0.026
(0.041)
-0.000
(0.039)
Acquirer Listed -0.081*
(0.048)
-0.058
(0.045)
-0.080
(0.048)
-0.054
(0.045)
Log Age (Acq.) -0.012
(0.016)
-0.003
(0.020)
-0.012
(0.016)
-0.003
(0.021)
Intercept -0.605*
(0.337)
19.329
(29.693)
0.960
(25.995)
-0.669*
(0.344)
19.104
(29.610)
0.365
(25.783)
Country-level controls No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
N 885 785 782 885 785 782
R2 0.244 0.288 0.285 0.245 0.288 0.286
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in speciﬁc industries (see Mitchell & Mulherin, 1996). These may, for example, be caused by
substantial deregulation within certain industries or an increase in competition that leads to
a consolidation in particular production sectors. Any of these events may both be related to
changes in productivity and increased foreign acquisition activity within the speciﬁc industry,
the latter being generally associated with higher tax rate diﬀerentials. For instance, a slow-
down in productivity growth of an industry in a particular country makes ﬁrms in this
industry potential takeover targets for foreign, more competitive ﬁrms. This implies larger
tax rate diﬀerentials for acquisitions in this industry but also lower productivity gains if the
foreign acquisition cannot completely reverse the downward trend in productivity growth.
Ignoring within-industry developments may thus induce a spurious correlation between
merger-induced TFP changes and tax rate diﬀerentials that is unrelated to the mechanism
suggested in our theoretical model above. We account for this eﬀect by conducting an ad-
ditional estimation in which we scale the dependent variable by the industry average. In
particular, we use the diﬀerence in the logarithm of average productivity before and after
the merger relative to the industry mean (SIC 2 digit code). Results are presented in column
(3) of Table 5 which otherwise repeats the speciﬁcations of column (2). The eﬀect of the
tax diﬀerential on the change in TFP is still signiﬁcantly negative and potentially mitigated
by loose transfer pricing regulations. These ﬁndings suggest that our results are robust to
accounting for industry trends in productivity and are thus not driven by industry-speciﬁc
shifts.
In all of the augmented regressions, the coeﬃcient for the absolute tax diﬀerential remains
signiﬁcantly negative. Using regression (2) with the full set of controls and a straight-forward
interpretation of the observed eﬀect as a conservative benchmark, we ﬁnd that an increase
in the absolute tax diﬀerential between acquirer and target location by 1 percentage point
drives down the merger-induced productivity gain by about 4.5%.
We complement our analysis in columns (4) to (6) by allowing for diﬀerent coeﬃcients for
positive and negative tax diﬀerentials. Again, column (4) presents the results for regressing
the tax diﬀerentials on the variables of interest and a set of ﬁxed eﬀects. The coeﬃcient
for negative tax diﬀerentials (i.e. tax diﬀerences where the eﬀective tax rate of the target
location is below that of the acquirer location) is signiﬁcantly negative while the coeﬃcient
for positive tax diﬀerences is insigniﬁcant. This suggests that deals with targets in low-
tax jurisdictions drive our main result. When adding control variables in column (5) or
controlling for industry-speciﬁc trends in column (6), we again obtain the result that deals
involving low-tax targets have a particularly negative impact on the post-merger productivity
change.
One explanation for this ﬁnding is that the potential for productivity improvement is
probably higher in the target ﬁrm. Thus, negative tax diﬀerences, that induce the mana-
gement to continue the operation of some less productive units in the target have a more
negative impact on overall productivity than positive tax diﬀerences that would only reduce
the post-merger productivity gain by a substantial amount if there is a suﬃcient number
of units in the acquirer location whose productivity is inferior to that of the corresponding
units in the target ﬁrm. If generally most of the adjustment takes place in the target ﬁrm,
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one may also refer to asymmetric adjustment costs in factor demand (Hamermesh & Pfann,
1996) as a complementary explanation. Jaramillo et al. (1993) show that the cost for lowe-
ring labor demand is much higher than for increasing it and the persistent nature of capital
investment implies that downward adjustment is also more expensive for this factor (Pin-
dyck, 1988). The excessive reduction in resources in the target ﬁrm that would be induced
by positive tax diﬀerentials is thus likely to be more costly than the relative increase of re-
sources resulting from negative tax diﬀerences, especially if this means that resources remain
where they are and no net adjustment takes place. In this setting, negative tax diﬀerences
are more likely to have an impact on management decisions and thus aﬀect productivity
changes more strongly.
Table 6: Transfer Pricing Regulation
OLS regression. The dependent variable in columns (1), (2), (4) and (5) is the diﬀerence in the logarithm
of average productivity after and before the merger. In column (3) the dependent variable is the diﬀerence
in the logarithm of average productivity before and after the merger relative to the industry mean (SIC 2
digit code). Columns (2)-(5) contain regression results with control variables for which estimated coeﬃcients
are reported in Table A.2 in the Appendix. All regressions include target and acquirer country ﬁxed eﬀects,
target and acquirer industry ﬁxed eﬀects and year ﬁxed eﬀects. Cluster robust standard errors (clustered
at the acquirer-target country-pair level) are provided in parentheses. Stars behind coeﬃcients indicate the
signiﬁcance level, * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
∆τ -0.041***
(0.013)
-0.062***
(0.020)
-0.048***
(0.016)
-0.072***
(0.027)
-0.071**
(0.028)
∆τ × LOOSE 0.042*
(0.021)
0.058**
(0.022)
0.035*
(0.019)
LOOSE -0.010
(0.060)
-0.052
(0.082)
0.021
(0.071)
∆τ × LOOSEAcq 0.059***
(0.021)
∆τ × LOOSETgt -0.005
(0.021)
LOOSEAcq -0.196
(0.157)
LOOSETgt 0.176
(0.177)
∆τ × LOOSEHigh 0.048**
(0.024)
∆τ × LOOSELow 0.006
(0.024)
LOOSEHigh -0.085
(0.125)
LOOSELow 0.061
(0.139)
Intercept -0.669*
(0.349)
28.887
(31.473)
6.007
(26.900)
23.562
(31.612)
25.153
(31.327)
Country-level controls No Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 885 785 782 785 785
R2 0.249 0.296 0.290 0.296 0.295
In the next set of regressions, which is presented in Table 6, we analyze how transfer
pricing regulation aﬀects our results. In the regression in column (1) of Table 6 we add the
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interaction of the tax rate diﬀerential and LOOSE, our indicator for the strictness of transfer
pricing regulation, to the benchmark speciﬁcation displayed in columns (1) to (3) in Table
5. As before, the coeﬃcient of the absolute tax diﬀerential ∆τ is signiﬁcantly negative.
The coeﬃcient of the interaction between ∆τ and an indicator for loose transfer pricing
regulations is signiﬁcantly positive. This suggests that the impact of the tax diﬀerential on
the productivity change is mitigated if transfer pricing regulation is not very strict and ﬁrms
are able to reduce the eﬀective tax rate diﬀerence between the locations by engaging in proﬁt
shifting activities. Furthermore, our results suggest that if the tax law in the acquirer and the
target country either does not contain transfer pricing regulations or does not require ﬁrms
to provide a written documentation of their transfer pricing system, this may neutralize the
eﬀect of the tax diﬀerential. In particular, we cannot reject the hypothesis that α1+α2 = 0 in
our sample.18 This ﬁnding is robust to adding control variables and controlling for industry
trends in columns (2) and (3), respectively.
Does transfer pricing legislation matter more in the target or in the acquirer location? We
answer this question by disaggregating LOOSE into two indicators for the strictness of trans-
fer pricing regulation in the acquirer and the target country, LOOSEAcq and LOOSETgt.
Results presented in column (4) suggest that legislation in the acquirer location is much
more important than in the target location. Given our ﬁndings above, this is not surprising.
Our estimation results in Table 5 indicate that the results are mainly driven by negative tax
diﬀerences, that is, when proﬁts of the target are taxed at a lower rate than proﬁts of the
acquirer. In this case ﬁrms would like to shift proﬁts away from the acquirer location to the
target ﬁrm. This is what stricter transfer pricing legislation in the former would be imple-
mented to inhibit. On the contrary, raising transfer pricing documentation requirements in
the low-tax target location might increase overall transparency but is probably not designed
to prevent proﬁt shifting to this location (Bucovetsky & Hauﬂer, 2008) and is therefore less
relevant.
An alternative disaggregation would be to diﬀerentiate between the strictness of trans-
fer pricing legislation in the location with the higher and the lower eﬀective tax rate,
LOOSEHigh and LOOSELow. Results for this approach are presented in column (5) of
Table 6. Consistent with the idea described above that legislation to curb proﬁt shifting
via transfer pricing is more important in the high-tax location, we ﬁnd that the estimated
coeﬃcient for LOOSEHigh is much bigger than the one for LOOSELow. The latter is not
signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero.
5.2 Allocation of Productive Factors
We now extend our analysis to explore the mechanisms that underlie our main result. Ineﬃ-
cient reallocations after M&As can take various forms. The management can either allocate
too many or too few resources to either the acquirer or the target depending on the sign
of the tax diﬀerence between the locations of the two ﬁrms. Our theoretical model is not
conditional on such biases which has the advantage of very general results but also precludes
18Conducting a simple Wald test, we obtain F -Statistics of 0.00, 0.13 and 0.62 for the regressions in
columns (1), (2) and (3) of Table 6, respectively.
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us from forming any expectations about how the eﬀect evolves in practice. Instead, we rely
on empirical evidence to identify particular channels.
Table 7: Panel Regression: Total Factor Productivity
OLS regression. The dependent variable is the logarithm of total factor productivity of the combined ﬁrm in
columns (1)-(2), of the target ﬁrm in columns (3)-(4) and the acquirer ﬁrm in columns (5)-(6). All regressions
include country-level controls for which estimated coeﬃcients are reported in Table A.3 in the Appendix.
Cluster robust standard errors (clustered at the ﬁrm level) are provided in parentheses. All regressions
include ﬁrm and industry-year ﬁxed eﬀects. Stars behind coeﬃcients indicate the signiﬁcance level, * 10%,
** 5%, *** 1%.
(1)
Combined
Firm
(2)
Combined
Firm
(3)
Target
Firm
(4)
Target
Firm
(5)
Acquirer
Firm
(6)
Acquirer
Firm
POST -0.805***
(0.217)
-0.809***
(0.212)
-0.851***
(0.315)
-0.847***
(0.312)
-0.667**
(0.281)
-0.664**
(0.275)
POST ×∆τ -0.035***
(0.011)
-0.042***
(0.015)
-0.020*
(0.011)
POST ×∆τ− -0.035***
(0.012)
-0.046**
(0.020)
-0.017
(0.011)
POST ×∆τ+ -0.034**
(0.016)
-0.036*
(0.020)
-0.025
(0.017)
POST×Cross-
border
-0.040
(0.086)
-0.045
(0.086)
-0.017
(0.122)
-0.050
(0.121)
-0.061
(0.103)
-0.057
(0.104)
POST×Hostile -0.294
(0.188)
-0.301
(0.187)
-0.292
(0.338)
-0.311
(0.343)
-0.223**
(0.098)
-0.228**
(0.098)
POST×Stock-for-
Stock
-0.097
(0.159)
-0.095
(0.160)
-0.706***
(0.196)
-0.707***
(0.199)
0.252
(0.179)
0.243
(0.182)
POST×Capital
Increase
0.010
(0.102)
0.010
(0.102)
0.638***
(0.169)
0.653***
(0.170)
-0.371***
(0.108)
-0.369***
(0.109)
POST×Horizontal 0.025
(0.033)
0.023
(0.033)
-0.053
(0.054)
-0.062
(0.054)
0.041
(0.036)
0.040
(0.036)
POST×Toehold 0.142*
(0.078)
0.140*
(0.079)
0.087
(0.119)
0.080
(0.118)
0.108
(0.081)
0.109
(0.081)
POST×Acquirer
Listed
-0.036
(0.059)
-0.037
(0.060)
-0.190*
(0.099)
-0.192*
(0.101)
0.055
(0.064)
0.052
(0.065)
Relative Size -0.001**
(0.000)
-0.001**
(0.000)
0.001
(0.001)
0.001
(0.001)
-0.001*
(0.000)
-0.001**
(0.000)
Leverage (Acq.) 0.000
(0.000)
0.000
(0.000)
-0.000
(0.000)
-0.000
(0.000)
0.003***
(0.000)
0.003***
(0.000)
Leverage (Tgt.) 0.001
(0.020)
0.002
(0.020)
-0.016
(0.034)
-0.016
(0.034)
0.007
(0.011)
0.007
(0.011)
Log Age (Acq.) 0.005
(0.054)
0.006
(0.054)
0.047
(0.079)
0.043
(0.078)
0.030
(0.063)
0.032
(0.062)
Log Age (Tgt.) 0.032
(0.042)
0.028
(0.042)
0.094
(0.069)
0.089
(0.069)
-0.039
(0.044)
-0.041
(0.044)
Country-level
controls
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 5,075 5,102 5,072 5,099 5,072 5,099
R2 0.239 0.236 0.191 0.187 0.295 0.293
For this purpose, we turn to a panel analysis in order to follow the evolution of important
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determinants of total factor productivity over time. This allows us to control for co-moving
variables and general time trends. In columns (1) and (2) of Table 7 we repeat our main
analysis in a panel regression framework to demonstrate that this approach also captures
the negative eﬀect of the tax diﬀerential on TFP. The coeﬃcient of the interaction between
the absolute tax diﬀerence and the post-merger dummy is signiﬁcantly negative. This is the
case both for positive and for negative tax diﬀerences although we note that negative tax
diﬀerences appear to be somewhat more important with a slightly larger magnitude for the
corresponding coeﬃcient.
Next, we turn to the target ﬁrm, that is, instead of the TFP of the combined ﬁrm
we relate the tax diﬀerential to the estimated TFP of the target ﬁrm only. Our results in
column (3) suggest, that the productivity gain on the target level is substantially lower
when the absolute tax diﬀerential is positive.19 In particular, we ﬁnd that a one percentage
point increase in the absolute tax diﬀerence lowers the merged-induced change in target
productivity by 4.2%. We also explore whether this result is rather driven by negative or
positive tax diﬀerentials, that is, whether lower productivity gains are a result of the target
being located in a low-tax or high-tax country with respect to the acquirer location. The
results for the corresponding estimation are presented in column (4). The coeﬃcient for
the interaction of the post-merger dummy with the absolute magnitude of the negative tax
diﬀerential, ∆τ−, is negative and highly signiﬁcant. In contrast, the coeﬃcient for the related
interaction with the positive tax diﬀerential, ∆τ+, is only marginally signiﬁcant and much
smaller in magnitude. This ﬁnding suggests that the negative eﬀect of tax diﬀerentials on
the post-merger productivity change in the target in our sample is mainly driven by deals
where proﬁts received from the target are taxed at a lower rate than those generated in the
acquirer country.
We then conduct a similar analysis for the acquiring ﬁrm in columns (5) and (6). Our
results indicate that tax diﬀerentials have a much smaller impact on acquirer productivity.
With a coeﬃcient of -0.02 the estimated eﬀect is less then half the magnitude found for target
ﬁrms and only marginally signiﬁcant. When relating the TFP of the acquirer to negative
and positive tax diﬀerentials separately, we do not obtain precise results. The respective
coeﬃcients are negative but insigniﬁcant.
These ﬁndings point to the target ﬁrm as the entity within the merged ﬁrm where tax
diﬀerentials are most harmful for productivity gains. Although the estimated impact of the
tax diﬀerential is a novel eﬀect with regard to M&A outcomes, it is not surprising that
the main impact relates to the target ﬁrm as this is the place where probably most of the
reorganization occurs after the merger. How the tax diﬀerential aﬀects this process should
also be visible in the data. In our next estimation we therefore trace the evolution of the
input factors labor and capital before and after the M&A completion and analyze how their
use is aﬀected by tax diﬀerentials.
We begin this analysis with employment and present our ﬁndings in Table 8. The ﬁrst
two columns show results with respect to the target ﬁrm. A negative, albeit insigniﬁcant
19The results presented here are estimated including the full set of controls. We also estimated the corre-
sponding models without ﬁrm-, country- and deal-level controls and obtained very similar results.
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coeﬃcient for the post-merger dummy in column (1) suggests that ﬁrms reduce employment
in the target ﬁrm after the merger. However, this reduction is mitigated when there is a
positive absolute tax diﬀerential. The estimation suggests that the post-merger employment
cut is reduced by 2% per percentage point of absolute tax diﬀerence. As we focus on the
target ﬁrm in this estimation, it is again useful to separate the absolute tax diﬀerential
into positive and negative tax diﬀerences. We do this in column (2). Consistent with our
theoretical explanations above, target employment is mainly aﬀected by negative rather than
positive tax diﬀerences.
Table 8: Panel Regression: Employment
OLS regression. The dependent variable is the logarithm of the total number of employees of the target
ﬁrm in columns (1)-(2) and the acquirer ﬁrm in columns (3)-(4). All regression results contain country-level
controls for which estimated coeﬃcients are reported in Table A.4 in the Appendix. Cluster robust standard
errors (clustered at the ﬁrm level) are provided in parentheses. All regressions include ﬁrm and industry-year
ﬁxed eﬀects. Stars behind coeﬃcients indicate the signiﬁcance level, * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%.
(1)
Target
Firm
(2)
Target
Firm
(3)
Acquirer
Firm
(4)
Acquirer
Firm
POST -0.402
(0.288)
-0.166
(0.278)
-0.126
(0.206)
-0.127
(0.204)
POST ×∆ 0.021*
(0.012)
-0.019*
(0.010)
POST ×∆τ− 0.033***
(0.011)
-0.019*
(0.010)
POST ×∆τ+ 0.005
(0.018)
-0.019
(0.014)
POST×Cross-border -0.083
(0.102)
-0.006
(0.098)
0.024
(0.079)
0.032
(0.078)
POST×Hostile -0.473***
(0.101)
-0.242
(0.167)
-0.449**
(0.210)
-0.443**
(0.210)
POST×Stock-for-Stock -0.435**
(0.186)
-0.519***
(0.187)
0.949***
(0.190)
0.948***
(0.192)
POST×Capital Increase 0.037
(0.131)
0.014
(0.127)
-1.004***
(0.112)
-1.007***
(0.113)
POST×Horizontal -0.009
(0.051)
-0.004
(0.049)
-0.004
(0.040)
-0.002
(0.040)
POST×Toehold 0.172
(0.118)
0.185
(0.117)
-0.103
(0.112)
-0.101
(0.112)
POST×Acquirer Listed 0.138*
(0.075)
0.155**
(0.071)
0.094
(0.081)
0.098
(0.083)
Leverage (Acq.) 0.000**
(0.000)
0.000***
(0.000)
0.000
(0.000)
0.000
(0.000)
Leverage (Tgt.) -0.065***
(0.018)
-0.059***
(0.019)
0.017
(0.013)
0.015
(0.014)
Log Age (Acq.) 0.000
(0.071)
0.040
(0.048)
0.265***
(0.067)
0.263***
(0.067)
Log Age (Tgt.) 0.250***
(0.082)
0.242***
(0.061)
0.034
(0.050)
0.039
(0.050)
Country-level controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 5,096 5,123 5,096 5,123
R2 0.209 0.185 0.317 0.314
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The opposite eﬀect is observed with regard to the acquiring ﬁrm for which we present
results in columns (3) and (4). Higher absolute tax diﬀerentials enhance the post-merger
employment cut in the acquirer by 1.9% points for each percentage point in tax diﬀerence.
Again, separating the tax diﬀerential in positive and negative diﬀerences suggests that this
result is driven by M&As where a ﬁrm in a high-tax country takes over a ﬁrm located in a
low-tax country.
We repeat this analysis for the other input factor capital which is measured as the
logarithm of tangible ﬁxed assets. Results are shown in Table 9 where the ﬁrst two columns
refer to the target ﬁrm. Similar to the eﬀect on labor input, the estimation suggests that
an increase in the absolute tax diﬀerential has a positive eﬀect on the use of capital in the
target after the merger. Furthermore, the signiﬁcantly positive coeﬃcient of the interaction
between the post-merger dummy and ∆τ− in column (2) indicates that this is mainly driven
by negative tax diﬀerences. An increase in the magnitude of the negative tax diﬀerence
between target and acquirer raises merger-induced change in capital employed in the target
by 4.6% per percentage point. In contrast, we do not ﬁnd a signiﬁcant eﬀect of positive tax
diﬀerences on the post-merger level of capital in the target which mirrors the asymmetry
observed for labor input. Firms only adjust the post-merger use of input factors in the target
to tax rate diﬀerentials if the target is located in a country with an eﬀective tax rate below
that of the acquirer location. If the acquirer resides in a country with a more favorable tax
regime, no reaction occurs.
Turning to capital employment in the acquirer ﬁrm we cannot identify a signiﬁcant eﬀect
of the absolute tax diﬀerential. The corresponding coeﬃcient in column (3) is negative but
relatively small and not signiﬁcant. We also do not ﬁnd a signiﬁcant impact if we diﬀerentiate
between positive and negative diﬀerences. Thus, acquirer ﬁrms in our sample do not adjust
their post-merger investment policies to tax diﬀerences. On the one hand, this may reﬂect
that ﬁrms ﬁnd it easier to adjust labor input than to decrease or increase capital. On the
other hand, acquirer ﬁrms are usually much bigger than target ﬁrms, especially in terms of
assets, and may adjust their capital stock because of various factors unrelated to taxation.
Such noise in the data would prevent us from precisely measuring the eﬀect of the tax
diﬀerence on changes in the capital employment of the acquirer following the M&A.
The main channel through which tax diﬀerentials aﬀect the realization of productivity
changes in M&As thus appears to be that they reduce the scale of adjustment in the target
ﬁrm when the tax burden for proﬁts is lower there. Previous empirical studies have already
shown that target ﬁrms often undergo a period of substantial restructuring after the com-
pletion of an M&A (e.g. Maksimovic et al., 2011; Li, 2013). However, our results suggest
that diﬀerences in taxation are relevant with regard to the magnitude and the speed of
such adjustments. For instance, our results suggest that ﬁrms reallocate less activity away
from targets that are located in low-tax locations. This distortion hampers the realization of
productivity gains in these ﬁrms and thus has a negative impact on the overall productivity
gain in the merged enterprise.
We complement our analysis using the event study design described above. Results are
displayed in Figure 2 which plots the coeﬃcients of the interactions between the event
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Table 9: Panel Regression: Capital
OLS regression. The dependent variable is the logarithm of tangible ﬁxed assets of the target ﬁrm in columns
(1)-(2) and the acquirer ﬁrm in columns (3)-(4). All regression results contain country-level controls for which
estimated coeﬃcients are reported in Table A.4 in the Appendix. Cluster robust standard errors (clustered
at the ﬁrm level) are provided in parentheses. All regressions include ﬁrm and industry-year ﬁxed eﬀects.
Stars behind coeﬃcients indicate the signiﬁcance level, * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%.
Assets
(1)
Target
(2)
Target
(3)
Acquirer
(4)
Acquirer
POST -0.065
(0.440)
-0.083
(0.436)
-0.009
(0.348)
-0.049
(0.344)
POST ×∆τ 0.031*
(0.017)
-0.005
(0.018)
POST ×∆τ− 0.040**
(0.018)
-0.014
(0.021)
POST ×∆τ+ 0.023
(0.026)
0.011
(0.021)
POST×Cross-border 0.118
(0.193)
0.113
(0.188)
-0.135
(0.153)
-0.137
(0.150)
POST×Hostile -0.274
(0.290)
-0.275
(0.290)
-0.227
(0.139)
-0.220
(0.140)
POST×Stock-for-Stock -0.169
(0.351)
-0.190
(0.356)
2.061***
(0.313)
2.093***
(0.315)
POST×Capital Increase 0.040
(0.244)
0.039
(0.245)
-2.315***
(0.185)
-2.333***
(0.184)
POST×Horizontal 0.089
(0.092)
0.090
(0.092)
-0.081
(0.068)
-0.077
(0.067)
POST×Toehold -0.033
(0.174)
-0.029
(0.173)
0.139
(0.183)
0.142
(0.183)
POST×Acquirer Listed 0.198
(0.178)
0.195
(0.180)
0.224
(0.143)
0.235
(0.143)
Leverage (Acq.) 0.000
(0.000)
0.000
(0.000)
0.036
(0.055)
0.037
(0.055)
Leverage (Tgt.) 0.081***
(0.030)
0.081***
(0.030)
0.038**
(0.018)
0.037**
(0.018)
Log Age (Acq.) -0.220*
(0.132)
-0.209
(0.131)
0.250**
(0.109)
0.249**
(0.108)
Log Age (Tgt.) 0.205
(0.139)
0.204
(0.139)
0.181*
(0.104)
0.187*
(0.103)
Country-level controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 5,075 5,102 5,084 5,111
R2 0.199 0.198 0.307 0.307
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Figure 2: Event Study
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Standard errors are clustered on ﬁrm level. 95% conﬁdence intervals are reported. Estimations include ﬁrm-
ﬁxed and industry-year-ﬁxed eﬀects.
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dummies and the tax rate diﬀerential against the number of years relative to the merger
completion. In panel (a), the dependent variable is the TFP of the combined ﬁrm. After an
M&A is completed, TFP declines relative to one year prior to the merger. This decrease is
persistent over time and even increases in later periods. Panels (b) and (c) present results for
acquirer and target ﬁrms separately. For the latter, we observe a signiﬁcant decrease in TFP
two and three years after the merger. This suggests that the eﬀect of tax rate diﬀerentials
on merger-induced productivity continues at least over the medium run. In contrast, there is
no eﬀect of tax rate diﬀerentials on TFP of the acquirer neither before nor after the merger.
Turning to the eﬀect of the tax diﬀerential on employment, we observe in panels (d) and
(e) that it has opposite directions for the target and the acquirer. Relative to the year before
the merger, employment signiﬁcantly increases in the target from 2 years after the M&A
completion onward. The eﬀect increases over time. For the acquirer, the eﬀect is negative,
albeit of much smaller magnitude. It only persists in the short-run but is zero in year 4 after
the merger. The impact of tax diﬀerences on capital is less clear-cut. There is a marginally
signiﬁcant positive eﬀect on target capital two years after the M&A is executed but this
quickly reverses. For the acquirer, we ﬁnd no signiﬁcant change in capital in any post-
merger year. These results point to employment as the factor whose adjustment is aﬀected
most strongly by tax diﬀerences between target and acquirer ﬁrm. At least for the acquirer,
these responses are not quickly reversed but continue over a substantial period of time. For
capital, the eﬀect is less pronounced which probably reﬂects that adjustment cost is higher
for this factor as indicated, for example, by Hall (2004).
In none of the event study analyses do we observe a signiﬁcant response of the outcome
variable prior to the merger.20 This rules out that pre-merger trends in the outcome variable
drive our results and strongly points to the M&A completion as the event that triggers the
eﬀect of the tax diﬀerential which strengthens the causal interpretation of our results.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we investigate how the productivity change after corporate M&As is aﬀected by
diﬀerences in proﬁt taxation between the target and the acquirer location. In our theoretical
model, tax diﬀerentials between the locations of ﬁrms involved in an M&A distort the
post-merger reallocation of productive activity. If tax diﬀerences are large enough, ﬁrms
assign some activity to units that are less productive but more proﬁtable due to a lower tax
burden. With respect to overall productivity in the combined ﬁrm, this choice is ineﬃcient
and reduces the productivity gain after the M&A.
We then employ ﬁrm-level data to test this notion empirically. First, we derive ﬁrm-
level estimates of TFP using the Levinsohn & Petrin (2003) method. We then compute the
merger-induced change in TFP in the combined ﬁrm and relate it to the absolute value of
the diﬀerence between the eﬀective tax rate on proﬁts received from the target in the form
of inter-corporate dividends and the tax rate applied to proﬁts generated by the acquirer.
20The graphical observation is conﬁrmed using a Wald test for the joint insigniﬁcance of the interaction
of the pre-merger dummies with the absolute tax rate diﬀerential.
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Our results suggest that an increase in the absolute tax diﬀerential by one percentage point
reduces the merger-induced productivity gains by 4.5%. Consistent with our expectation
that tax diﬀerentials are less distortive if ﬁrms are able to reattribute part of their proﬁt
from high-tax to low-tax locations, we ﬁnd that the impact of the tax diﬀerential is mitiga-
ted when transfer pricing regulations are less strict such that ﬁrms can more easily engage
in proﬁt shifting. In a complementary analysis, we explore the mechanisms that drive the
impact of tax diﬀerences on overall ﬁrm productivity. Our ﬁndings indicate that the eﬀect
is asymmetric. It is mainly driven by M&A deals where ﬁrms located in high-tax countries
acquire a ﬁrm in a low-tax country and fail to eﬃciently adjust the input factors of pro-
duction in the target to fully realize the productivity gain. In contrast, tax diﬀerentials that
would induce a relocation of activity to the acquirer location have no signiﬁcant impact on
overall ﬁrm productivity. This probably reﬂects the observation that post-merger adjustment
relative to ﬁrm size is usually much larger in the target entity.
An important limitation to our analysis, which is inherent to many empirical studies of
corporate M&A, is that we only observe completed deals. Both potential productivity gains
and the tax diﬀerential aﬀect the expected beneﬁt from an M&A deal in terms of future
proﬁts. These factors may thus inﬂuence whether or not a deal is completed. In particular,
we may be less likely to observe M&As with low productivity gains and small tax diﬀerentials
because these deals lack two important sources of future beneﬁts. Due to the large number of
domestic deals, this is, however, not observed in practice. Alternatively, productivity gains
and tax rates may interact in their potential to increase post-merger returns. However, they
do so only with respect to the level of tax rates in the individual locations. An increase
in production is more valuable if the resulting proﬁt is taxed at a lower rate. However,
there is no obvious interaction in this regard between productivity gains and the tax rate
diﬀerence. Thus, even though our estimations are exposed to biases similar to those of other
M&A studies, this is unlikely to drive our empirical results. In particular, the results of an
event study analysis reject the presence of pre-merger trends which strengthens the causal
inference from our estimations.
The ﬁndings of this paper have several important implications. First, they point to a
potential advantage of tax regimes that are neutral with respect to the location of investment.
These are mainly regimes with high domestic corporate tax rates that avoid international
double taxation through a credit on foreign tax payments such as the United States. In
contrast, systems that exempt foreign proﬁts from domestic taxation usually imply eﬀective
international tax diﬀerences. Devereux et al. (2015) suggest higher tax administration costs
as a potential motive for switching from a credit to an exemption regime despite the distortive
impact of the latter. In the light of our ﬁndings, these beneﬁts should, however, be carefully
weighted against negative eﬀects on the eﬃciency of international factor allocation.
Second, tax diﬀerentials turn out to be an additional impediment to cross-border know-
ledge ﬂows that has so far been largely ignored. Given that a large fraction of conventional
trade barriers has been eliminated in comprehensive bilateral and multilateral agreements,
substantial diﬀerences in tax policy across countries are likely to emerge as an important
obstacle to the international transmission of technology.
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Finally, while the analysis of ﬁrm reactions to international tax competition has so far
mostly focused on its relevance for ﬁnancial accounting (see Hines Jr, 1999), our results
highlight that diﬀerences in taxation are also harmful in real terms by reducing productivity
growth. We show that ﬁrms make real adjustments not only with respect to the level of
domestic tax rates but also with regard to the international tax system. Furthermore, in
contrast to ﬁnancial eﬀects such as proﬁt shifting for which tax competition between de-
veloped countries and so-called tax havens is an important driver, the real eﬀect that we
identify in this paper mainly refers to tax diﬀerentials between developed economies. These
are more likely to be linked by real cross-border investments and are thus more exposed to
the negative impact of distortive tax rate diﬀerences.
Appendix
A.1 Productivity Estimation Data Sample
We obtain unconsolidated balance sheet data for the productivity estimation from Bureau
van Dijk's ORBIS and AMADEUS databases. In a ﬁrst step, missing values are imputed as
described in Gal (2013). In particular, ﬁrm value added is replaced by the sum of operating
revenue and material cost if missing. Conversely, material cost is replaced by the diﬀerence
between operating revenue and value added if both items are available.
The second step is to eliminate inconsistent data points from the sample. We drop all
ﬁrm-year observations with a sum of EBIT and cost of employees that is not strictly posi-
tive. Furthermore, we drop observations with negative operating revenue or material cost as
well as those with total assets below 1,000 USD. Further potential mistakes in the accounts
are captured by deleting extreme outliers. We drop observations for which any of the fol-
lowing ratios lies below the 0.1% or above the 99.9% quantile of the sample within a year:
operating revenue to total assets, number of employees to total assets, number of employees
to operating revenue, operating revenue less material cost to operating revenue, operating
revenue less material cost to number of employees. We also drop observations where the sum
of ﬁxed intangible assets, ﬁxed tangible assets and other ﬁxed assets does not add up to a
ﬁgure that is close to the entry for total ﬁxed assets (±5%).
Finally, we adjust the balance sheet items for inﬂation and cross-border diﬀerences in
purchasing power to obtain the evolution of productive factors and output in real terms. For
this purpose we apply the GDP deﬂator and the Purchasing Power Parity conversion factor
for the GDP for 2005 prices to the nominal balance sheet items.
A.2 Choice of Speciﬁcation
There are several ways to transform the dependent variable in the deal-level regression
model. Here, we consider four alternatives: the simple diﬀerence of TFP before and after
the merger, Γˆjlk = A
Post
j − APrej , the simple diﬀerence scaled by TFP before the merger,
Γˆjlk =
APostj −APrej
APrej
, the diﬀerence in logarithms, Γˆjlk = lnA
Post
j − lnAPrej and the diﬀerence
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Figure 3: Transformations of Dependent Variable
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in logarithms scaled by the logarithm of TFP before the merger, Γˆjlk =
lnAPostj −lnAPrej
lnAPrej
.
We regress each of these measures on the absolute tax diﬀerential ∆τjlk and a set of ﬁxed
eﬀects which corresponds to the model estimated in column (1) of Table 5 and plot the ﬁtted
values against the residuals. These plots are presented in Figure 3. Among the suggested
transformations, only the diﬀerence in logarithms, depicted in the upper left panel, generates
a random pattern that is required to assume a linear relationship after transforming the
dependent variable. All other transformations generate a non-random pattern of residuals
which implies that heteroskedasticity of the error terms is inherent in these models.
A.3 Additional Control Variables
Table A.1: Results for Country-level Controls of Regression Table 5
This table contains the coeﬃcients for the OLS regressions of columns (2), (3), (5) and (6) of Table 5. Cluster
robust standard errors (clustered at the acquirer-target country-pair level) are provided in parentheses. All
regressions include ﬁrm- and year-ﬁxed eﬀects. Stars behind coeﬃcients indicate the signiﬁcance level, *
10%, ** 5%, *** 1%.
Change in Total Factor Productivity
(2) (3) (5) (6)
CIT (Tgt.) -0.575
(2.072)
-0.108
(2.082)
-0.659
(2.142)
-0.366
(2.143)
Wage Diﬀerence 3.315
(2.576)
1.925
(2.509)
3.135
(2.561)
1.373
(2.509)
GDP p.c. Growth (Acq.) -3.857*
(2.201)
-3.351
(2.115)
-3.806*
(2.170)
-3.202
(2.053)
GDP p.c. Growth (Tgt.) 4.150*
(2.366)
3.052
(2.091)
4.095*
(2.350)
2.888
(2.054)
Log GDP (Acq.) -2.910
(2.233)
-1.303
(2.137)
-2.716
(2.240)
-0.711
(2.159)
Log GDP (Tgt.) 2.143
(2.195)
1.247
(2.110)
1.959
(2.208)
0.684
(2.107)
EU Member 0.017
(0.366)
-0.101
(0.390)
0.012
(0.368)
-0.115
(0.391)
Log Distance 0.019
(0.080)
0.013
(0.067)
0.018
(0.081)
0.009
(0.067)
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Table A.2: Results for Country-level Controls of Regression Table 6
This table contains the coeﬃcients for the control variables in the OLS regressions of columns (2), (3), (5)
and (6) of Table 6. Cluster robust standard errors (clustered at the acquirer-target country-pair level) are
provided in parentheses. All regressions include ﬁrm- and year-ﬁxed eﬀects. Stars behind coeﬃcients indicate
the signiﬁcance level, * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%.
Change in Total Factor Productivity
(2) (3) (5) (6)
Cross-border 0.086
(0.147)
0.060
(0.131)
0.101
(0.148)
0.083
(0.147)
Hostile -1.001**
(0.403)
-0.226
(0.327)
-0.972**
(0.408)
-0.968**
(0.409)
Stock-for-Stock 0.292*
(0.171)
0.266
(0.192)
0.264
(0.179)
0.276
(0.175)
Capital Increase -0.344***
(0.096)
-0.368***
(0.083)
-0.331***
(0.095)
-0.327***
(0.096)
Horizontal -0.040
(0.034)
-0.021
(0.026)
-0.041
(0.034)
-0.041
(0.034)
Toe 0.052
(0.094)
0.120
(0.095)
0.054
(0.093)
0.054
(0.093)
Relative Size -0.000
(0.000)
-0.000
(0.000)
-0.000
(0.000)
-0.000
(0.000)
Leverage (Acq.) 0.029
(0.041)
0.003
(0.039)
0.034
(0.042)
0.031
(0.042)
Acquirer Listed -0.067
(0.046)
-0.051
(0.043)
-0.071
(0.046)
-0.074
(0.048)
Log Age (Acq.) -0.009
(0.016)
0.000
(0.020)
-0.011
(0.016)
-0.012
(0.016)
CIT (Tgt.) -0.918
(1.899)
-0.292
(1.919)
-0.823
(1.904)
-0.806
(1.936)
Wage Diﬀerence 3.089
(2.443)
1.745
(2.407)
2.958
(2.748)
2.828
(2.467)
GDP p.c. Growth (Acq.) -4.167*
(2.171)
-3.731*
(2.037)
-3.884*
(2.144)
-4.023*
(2.139)
GDP p.c. Growth (Tgt) 4.702**
(2.344)
3.477
(2.097)
4.417*
(2.334)
4.510*
(2.282)
Log GDP (Acq.) -2.866
(2.104)
-1.193
(2.035)
-3.042
(2.417)
-2.704
(2.195)
Log GDP (Tgt.) 1.752
(2.090)
0.953
(2.021)
2.124
(2.438)
1.726
(2.152)
EU Member 0.010
(0.360)
-0.114
(0.394)
-0.004
(0.374)
0.020
(0.366)
Log Distance -0.032
(0.080)
-0.018
(0.067)
-0.031
(0.078)
-0.023
(0.075)
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Table A.3: Results for Country-level Controls of Regression Table 7
This table contains the coeﬃcients for the OLS regressions of Table 7. Cluster robust standard errors (cluste-
red at the ﬁrm level) are provided in parentheses. All regressions include ﬁrm and industry-year ﬁxed eﬀects.
Stars behind coeﬃcients indicate the signiﬁcance level, * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%.
(1)
Combined
Firm
(2)
Combined
Firm
(3)
Target
Firm
(4)
Target
Firm
(5)
Acquirer
Firm
(6)
Acquirer
Firm
CIT (Tgt.) 1.049*
(0.568)
1.134**
(0.567)
0.105
(0.831)
0.063
(0.829)
CIT (Acq.) 1.963***
(0.599)
2.024***
(0.598)
Wage Diﬀerence 1.274
(1.213)
1.176
(1.190)
3.343**
(1.392)
3.057**
(1.373)
0.614
(1.395)
0.739
(1.363)
GDP p.c. Growth (Acq.) 0.869
(0.568)
0.896
(0.560)
1.334
(0.823)
1.307
(0.798)
0.493
(0.619)
0.502
(0.614)
GDP p.c. Growth (Tgt.) -0.414
(0.501)
-0.385
(0.488)
-2.037***
(0.788)
-2.012***
(0.747)
0.384
(0.606)
0.455
(0.595)
Log GDP (Acq.) -1.416
(1.087)
-1.354
(1.069)
-2.878*
(1.516)
-2.779*
(1.483)
-1.309
(1.298)
-1.329
(1.279)
Log GDP (Tgt.) 1.099
(1.091)
1.091
(1.078)
1.506
(1.434)
1.526
(1.406)
1.278
(1.318)
1.308
(1.307)
POST×EU Member 0.193
(0.124)
0.183
(0.113)
0.069
(0.175)
-0.016
(0.179)
0.153
(0.111)
0.157
(0.103)
POST×Log Distance 0.107***
(0.040)
0.109***
(0.040)
0.151***
(0.057)
0.166***
(0.058)
0.082
(0.053)
0.081
(0.052)
Table A.4: Results for Country-level Controls of Regression Tables 8 and 9
This table contains the coeﬃcients for the OLS regressions of Table 8 in columns (1a)-(4a) of Table 9 in
columns (1b)-(4b). Cluster robust standard errors (clustered at the ﬁrm level) are provided in parentheses.
All regressions include ﬁrm and industry-year ﬁxed eﬀects. Stars behind coeﬃcients indicate the signiﬁcance
level, * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%.
Employment Assets
(1a)
Target
(2a)
Target
(3a)
Acquirer
(4a)
Acquirer
(1b)
Target
(2b)
Target
(3b)
Acquirer
(4b)
Acquirer
CIT (Tgt.) 0.949
(0.736)
0.899
(0.717)
-1.794
(1.247)
-1.617
(1.238)
CIT (Acq.) 0.230
(0.592)
0.151
(0.591)
-0.864
(1.068)
-0.941
(1.062)
Wage Diﬀerence 1.706
(1.349)
0.949***
(0.213)
-0.547
(1.186)
-0.467
(1.174)
0.498
(2.266)
1.052
(2.298)
2.160
(2.062)
1.712
(2.036)
GDP p.c. Growth (Acq.) 1.045
(0.755)
1.156*
(0.696)
0.303
(0.526)
0.327
(0.526)
0.584
(1.062)
0.461
(1.045)
-0.045
(0.979)
0.119
(0.938)
GDP p.c. Growth (Tgt.) -0.698
(0.758)
-0.529
(0.709)
0.160
(0.480)
0.177
(0.475)
-0.383
(1.038)
-0.260
(1.013)
0.144
(0.934)
-0.033
(0.881)
Log GDP (Acq.) -1.494
(1.419)
-0.094
(0.088)
-0.006
(1.114)
-0.018
(1.110)
-0.273
(2.525)
-0.491
(2.536)
-2.670
(2.010)
-2.494
(1.991)
Log GDP (Tgt.) 1.970
(1.364)
0.195**
(0.095)
0.243
(1.090)
0.237
(1.089)
1.001
(2.438)
1.083
(2.438)
2.010
(1.976)
1.885
(1.966)
POST×EU Member 0.090
(0.166)
0.085
(0.145)
-0.037
(0.091)
-0.021
(0.084)
0.088
(0.217)
0.132
(0.197)
-0.227*
(0.130)
-0.190
(0.125)
POST×Log Distance 0.045
(0.049)
0.004
(0.048)
0.035
(0.039)
0.032
(0.038)
-0.052
(0.090)
-0.056
(0.089)
0.053
(0.068)
0.052
(0.067)
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